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ABSTRACT
This article analyzes recent attempts to integrate the value of knowledge into glo-
bal economic statistics. It outlines how emerging human capital accounting (HCA)
standards apply concepts developed to value physical capital goods to the skills
embodied in national populations, making its value dependent on lifetime labor
market incomes. The intellectual legacy of neoclassical capital theory thereby frames
the way in which the value of knowledge is understood in contemporary global
governance in politically consequential ways. Drawing upon Karl Polanyi and recent
literature on the political economy of measurement, it argues these methodologies
reproduce the ‘economistic fallacy’, as they assume the exchange value of educa-
tional investment can be meaningfully isolated from its broader economic, cultural
and social functions. Such metrics consequently naturalize politically contestable
assumptions, reflecting comparative institutional factors rather than the substantive
contribution of education to human welfare. A case study of the influence of HCA
on the World Bank’s Human Capital Project demonstrates how the diffusion of
these valuation methods has implications for which national policy agendas are
deemed ‘sustainable’, particularly within debates on the future of welfare policy.
This case illustrates the wider importance of global accounting practices in con-
structing national economic policy space.
KEYWORDS
Human capital; national accounting; measurement; world bank; global governance; development
1. Introduction
Since the 1990s, with the emergence of endogenous growth theory (Romer, 1994),
knowledge has increasingly been viewed as the central economic asset of advanced
economies (OECD, 2001). Reflected in global policy discourse and national growth
strategies (Peters, 2009), this new way of framing the relationship between know-
ledge and the economy cuts in two directions. On the one hand, investment in
education is increasingly seen as vital to future competitiveness in a globalized and
automated world (Jorgenson & Fraumeni, 1992; Schultz, 1993). On the other hand,
the imperatives of securing global market share imply that education policy must
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shift to focusing on skills that offer maximum ‘value for money’ – both for individ-
ual students and society (Collini, 2012). These trends have crystallized around a
renewed focus on ‘human capital’ in global economic and development discourse,
that has reconstituted knowledge formation as a strategically important national
investment (WB, 2018b).
As a result of these broader ideational shifts, recent years have seen efforts to
measure the value of human capital in ways consistent with the United Nations
(UN) System of National Accounts (SNA), the central global framework for meas-
uring economic performance (OECD, 2012). Catalysed by the Stiglitz-Sen-Fitoussi
Commission and the wider ‘beyond GDP’ agenda (Stiglitz et al., 2010), in 2013 an
international task force on measuring human capital was set up by the Conference
of European Statisticians (CES). After a global consultation, the UN’s Economic
Commission for Europe (UNECE) produced an international framework for
national human capital accounts (2016), with the World Bank subsequently pro-
ducing estimates of national human capital stock based on this methodology (WB,
2018a). These international initiatives have informed and drawn upon parallel proj-
ects by national statistical institutes (NSIs) (ONS, 2015; Statistics Canada, 2010;
Statistics Norway, 2018). Work on human capital accounting (HCA) must be situ-
ated within broader ideational shifts within global economic governance discourse
that have expanded the concept of national wealth beyond manufactured and
financial assets to include natural resources, ecosystems and social institutions
(OECD, 2001; WB, 2018a). This wealth accounting approach, which frames sus-
tainability in terms of the preservation a comprehensive national balance sheet, has
become the dominant framework for measuring sustainable development (UNECE
& Eurostat & OECD, 2008; UNEP, 2014).
The importance of human capital accounting within statistical agencies
and international organisations (IOs) is consequently growing. As the UNECE
guide indicates:
Understanding and quantifying human capital is becoming increasingly necessary for
policymakers to better understand what drives economic growth and the functioning of
labour markets, to assess the long-term sustainability of a country’s development path, and
to measure the output and productivity performance of the educational sector (UNECE,
2016, p. iii).
However, in contrast with the attention given to the politics of ‘natural capital’
valuation, it has received relatively little attention within International Political
Economy (IPE) literature. Nevertheless, just as with natural capital, the valuation of
knowledge by powerful governance institutions has significant political implica-
tions. If left to the technical discourse of national accounting expertise, important
questions risk remaining unanswered: how do emerging global accounting stand-
ards for human capital frame national economic policy space? What theories and
ideas underpin these valuations, and which assumptions about the economic and
social value of knowledge do these naturalize? What implications do international
measurement practices have for democratic debates on the role of education
systems and labor markets in meeting the welfare challenges of the twenty-
first century?
This article answers these questions by critically evaluating the development and
use of global HCA standards. Drawing on 140 policy reports and methodological
guidelines (primarily UN, World Bank, OECD and ONS sources), as well as 30
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semi-structured interviews with statistical and accounting experts, its central contri-
bution is to de-naturalize the assumptions that underpin the valuation of national
human capital stocks and assess the way in which they frame national economic
policy space. In doing so, it contributes to recent debates on the political economy
of economic statistics and measurement (Miller, 2008; Davis et al., 2012; Hansen &
Porter, 2012; Linsi & M€ugge, 2019; Arag~ao & Linsi, 2020), uniting this with the lit-
erature on labour markets, social reproduction and the future of welfare systems
(LeBaron, 2010; Steans & Tepe, 2010; Standing, 2017).
Section 2 outlines how the intersections between national development policies
and global HCA practices – the ‘IPE of human capital accounting’ – has yet to be
sufficiently theorized in IPE literature. It introduces Karl Polanyi’s constructivist
and historical analysis of neoclassical economic ideas (Polanyi, 1968, 1977), and
insights from recent literature on the political economy of measurement, as a
framework to orient an inquiry into global HCA practices. Section 3 outlines the
intellectual genealogy of the contemporary HCA agenda, analyzing Irving Fischer’s
seminal neoclassical theory of capital (Fischer, 1906) and its influence on
‘comprehensive wealth accounting’ which now dominates sustainability measure-
ment in global economic governance. Section 4 demonstrates how the global HCA
agenda has grappled with the problems of applying historical accounting concepts
to the knowledge embodied in national populations. Finally, the article explores the
political implications of these measurement practices for global education and wel-
fare policy. Through a case study of the influence of HCA on World Bank funding
priorities through its Human Capital Project, it demonstrates how the growing use
of these measures frames policy responses to contemporary welfare challenges, del-
egitimizing those that rely on de-commodification or non-market institutions.
Under current methodologies, such policies erode the human capital base of a
country and necessarily appear unsustainable, regardless of their substantive effects
on economic welfare. The analysis also highlights how HCA has encountered per-
sistent operational challenges. The article thus demonstrates how measurements of
the value of knowledge exert increasing influence on global economic governance,
while emphasising their contingency and inherently political nature.
2. Theorising the political economy of human capital accounting
This section develops a theoretical framework for conceptualising the IPE of
human capital accounting. This field of research seeks to understand the links
between the measurement tools and accounting standards used to value knowledge
by states and IOs, the economic ideas these draw upon and how they frame global
education and welfare policy. These issues are growing in importance: firstly, as
accounting standards for human capital are developed and mainstreamed within
global economic governance (UNECE, 2016; WB, 2018a, 2018b); secondly, as the
transition to information and knowledge-based work makes education and skills
increasingly important to national economic competitiveness (WB, 2018a; UNEP,
2014); thirdly, as demographic change and automation pose new questions about
the role of labor markets in future welfare regimes (Gorz, 1999; Standing, 2017).
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2.1. A Polanyian framework for analyzing human capital accounting
Multiple literatures touch on aspects these issues, but the IPE of human capital
accounting has yet to be systematically investigated. For instance, from a
Foucauldian perspective many studies have analysed the discursive mobilization of
‘human capital’ as a disciplinary rationality of global neoliberal governance, and its
implications for the marketisation of global higher education policy (Simons, 2006;
Collini, 2012). These have tended to avoid the important question of valuation and
measurement. Other research has analysed the valuation of human capital in rela-
tion to changes in the accounting practices of private firms (Elias & Scarbrough,
2004), especially in the context of new competitive imperatives stemming from the
rise of the knowledge-based economy. Autonomist Marxism (Hardt & Negri, 2005;
Spence & Carter, 2011) has emphasized the limitations of capitalist governance in
information-based economies, with the shift to knowledge-based work presenting
novel difficulties in the measurement and extraction of surplus value. However,
since this literature is concerned with accounting practices within the firm, it has
not explored the valuation of knowledge by IOs, or the effects of this in framing
national policy space.
As a starting point for theorising the global politics of HCA, Karl Polanyi’s his-
torical and constructivist analysis of neoclassical economic thought – in particular
his critique of the ‘economistic fallacy’ (Polanyi, 1977, pp. 5-15) – provides a useful
conceptual framework. The enduring value of Polanyi’s work lies primarily in his
critique of the vision of humanity that emerged alongside the development of mar-
ket societies, and how this intellectual legacy continues to frame the way in which
contemporary political and ethical problems are understood (Holmes, 2012). He
highlighted how the contingent historical institutions and norms of modern
Western societies were universalized, how ‘strictly time-bound phenomena came to
be regarded as timeless, as transcending the age of the market’ (Polanyi, 1968, p.
61). Recent Polanyian scholarship has consequently emphasized the constraining
effects of the market view of the economy on contemporary political agency and
discourse (Block & Somers, 2014; Dale, 2010, pp. 19-44; Watson, 2005, pp. 143-
160). His ideas have particular application in understanding the politics of HCA, as
they highlight the distinctive properties of ‘human capital’ as an economic good,
stemming from the embodied nature of knowledge and its inseparability from
human existence tout court. This means accounting and valuation methods predi-
cated on isolating the exchange value of knowledge present distinctive analytical
and ethical dilemmas (Yarrow, 2018).
Polanyi’s view rested on a distinction between ‘formalist’ and ‘substantive’
understandings of the economy (Polanyi, 1977, pp. 19-25). Formalist reasoning
understands economic problems using an idealized model of market exchange.
This narrowed the focus of economic theory down to choices between alternative
uses of goods under conditions of scarcity (Dale, 2010, pp. 89-136; Holton, 1992,
pp. 7-22), exemplified by Lionel Robbins’ famous definition of economics as ‘the
science which studies human behaviour as a relationship between ends and scarce
means which have alternative uses’ (Robbins, 2008 [1932]). Thus, an analytical div-
ision is created in which ‘the economy’ is constructed as a free-standing object
encompassing the allocation of productive resources through the price mechanism,
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and ‘politics’ is understood as an equally distinct process through which ethical
and social considerations are debated (Holmes & Yarrow, 2019).
This formalist view of the economy was, in turn, dependent upon an ‘economistic
fallacy’ (Polanyi, 1977, pp. 5-15): the conflation of the human economy as a whole
with market institutions. Moreover, the dominance of this market-centric view of
economy and society has distorting effects on democracy and political reasoning. It
constrains how societies understand economic problems, narrowing the ideational
and conceptual space for ‘adjustment’ (Polanyi, 1968, p. 59) available to confront
pressing social, ecological and economic problems. This framework provides a nor-
mative and analytical lens through which to analyze how economic ideas and expert
practices come to frame the problems of affluent, post-industrial and information-
based societies. It highlights how the endurance of economistic fallacies in political
reasoning tends to delegitimize, or reduce the saliency of, solutions to social and eco-
logical problems which rely upon de-commodified relationships or commons-based
ownership structures, regardless of their potential contribution to substantive eco-
nomic welfare (Ostrom, 2015).
A distinctive feature of the political economy of HCA is that, in addition to
being a vital pre-condition for a functioning market economy, knowledge is also
embodied in people - it is a ‘fictitious capital’, to extend the Polanyian concept of a
fictitious commodity (Polanyi, 2001 [1944], pp. 136-140). It blends incommensur-
able (market and non-market) values. Consequently, its economic significance to
societies and individuals cannot be reduced to its exchange value – i.e. the labor
market returns it yields its ‘owner’ – without introducing analytical problems.
Methodological attempts to do this must depend on the fallacy that the labor mar-
ket returns on education can be meaningfully separated from its broader values.
While this analytical fiction may be justified by the aim of achieving methodo-
logical consistency with existing global accounting concepts, it is likely to prove dif-
ficult to uphold in practice. Furthermore, the diffusion of valuation technologies
based upon these assumptions within governance institutions will likely have
important political implications, which have yet to be adequately researched.
Polanyian theory gives us valuable conceptual resources to investigate the politics of
HCA. This can be usefully supplemented by recent literature on the political economy
and sociology of measurement in global economic governance (Miller, 2008; Davis et
al., 2012; Hansen & Porter, 2012; Linsi & M€ugge, 2019; Arag~ao & Linsi, 2020). Much
of this literature has taken its cue from theoretical work in Science and Technology
Studies, to move towards viewing economic theory as ‘performative’ of economic real-
ity (Callon, 1998; MacKenzie, 2005; Muniesa, 2014), while also stressing the import-
ance of technical infrastructures and calculative practices to the way in which
economic theory ‘makes its world’. In this literature, the emphasis is not on how eco-
nomic expertise is ‘wrong’ or ‘right’ in its representations of the world, but how these
representations produce effects, remaking the world in their image (Muniesa, 2014).
Polanyi foreshadowed the performative understanding of economic theory avant
la lettre, suggesting for example that: ‘indisputably the social sciences have a mas-
sive influence on man’s [sic] wishes and purposes… by creating the very phenom-
ena on the existence of which they were insisting – such as the utilitarian
psychology of the businessman’ (Polanyi, 2014, pp. 114-115). Indeed, foundational
works in this tradition cite Polanyi as inspiration (Callon, 1998, p. 2; Mitchell,
2008, p. 118; C¸alıs¸kan & Callon, 2009, p. 370). Nevertheless, such insights bring a
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sociologically richer and materially situated perspective to Polanyi’s normatively
inflected analysis of the politics of economic expertise. This literature, with Polanyi,
suggests that the notion of ‘the economy’ as an ontologically distinct object is a
remarkably recent achievement, associated with the view of human nature and
society which emerged in the eighteenth century. Importantly, however, it demon-
strates how this was only solidified in the late twentieth century, through the devel-
opment of various material practices and infrastructures such as national
accounting systems, econometric modelling, macroeconomic forecasting and inter-
national development expertise (Mitchell, 1998; Miller, 2008). They thus help sup-
plement Polanyian theory with an appreciation of how the ideas and discourses
which produce this reality are always suspended within a substrate of socio-tech-
nical expert practices. These must be investigated empirically to fully understand
how economic science interacts with political processes (C¸alıs¸kan & Callon, 2009).
Recent research has used these insights to extend the constructivist focus in IPE
beyond an examination of the impact of economic discourse and language, to
explore how apparently mundane technical and methodological practices such as
macroeconomic indicators (Davis et al., 2012; Karabell, 2014; Kelley & Simmons,
2015; M€ugge, 2016), accounting standards (Christophers, 2011; M€ugge & Stellinga,
2015), financial risk metrics (Kranke & Yarrow, 2019) and international benchmark-
ing practices (Broome & Quirk, 2015) also exercise important structuring effects on
global economic policy: both directly, as the measurement of economic phenomena
such as inflation has immediate distributive effects (M€ugge, 2016); and indirectly, by
framing the way in which governance problems are formulated and understood,
‘locking in’ certain theoretical understandings and assumptions and rendering phe-
nomena that are harder to quantify less politically salient (Porter, 1996; Miller, 2008).
One insight of this literature of particular relevance to the IPE of HCA is the
insight that attempts to render the world legible using the terms and categories of
economics are not equally successful: they do not always ‘work’ (Callon, 2010). The
world often stubbornly resists such projects, calling economistic forms of govern-
ance into question. In one sense, this observation supports normative critiques of
attempts to reduce complex social phenomena (such as human knowledge) to
quantifiable metrics. But it also suggests that these always incomplete attempts to
render the world governable by numbers encounter chronic ‘overflows’ and
‘misfires’ (Callon, 2010), opening the door to re-politicisation and contestation
(Barry, 2002). We should consequently expect knowledge (or ‘human capital’) to be
an especially important ‘test case’ of both the power and limits of economic expert-
ise to render the contemporary world governable in its terms, as it expands beyond
macroeconomics and high finance into pressing post-industrial governance issues
such as sustainability, inequality, automation and wellbeing.
2.2. Research methods
Using this conceptual framework, the rest of the article explores the political impli-
cations of the growing use of HCA in global economic governance. The empirical
analysis draws on semi-structured interviews as well as statistical reports, methodo-
logical literature and working papers. An extensive documentary search was con-
ducted prior to interviewing. This involved searching for relevant terms and key
words on the websites of major global economic governance institutes (UN, IMF,
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World Bank, WTO, OECD), EU agencies and major NSIs. Within-text references
to other documents and projects were then traced until saturation point. After fil-
tering out documents of limited relevance, a database of 140 documentary sources
was used to map the different actors involved in the global governance of HCA,
the different methodological approaches developed, the technical problems associ-
ated with these and the policy contexts in which they are used.
To supplement the documentary sources, 30 expert interviews were conducted with
statistical experts. Initial interview targets were selected to provide a variety of seniority
and job role and even distribution between different statistical agencies. Interviews
focused on clarifying the various HCA projects and their relationships, discussing the
main technical and conceptual issues confronted in developing HCAs and interviewees’
understanding of the use and application of HCA in IOs policy work.
3. Placing knowledge inside the economy: A genealogy of human
capital accounting
This section firstly traces the theoretical roots of contemporary HCA frameworks,
through an analysis of Irving Fischer’s neoclassical theory of capital, showing how
this informs the contemporary agenda on comprehensive wealth accounting and
sustainability measurement in global economic governance.
3.1. Neoclassical capital theory: Broadening the scope, narrowing
the meaning
Through the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries, while various economists attempted
to define ‘capital’ it remained a vague and contested concept (see Fisher, 1896).
Reflecting its origins in accounting practice (Carruthers & Espeland, 1991), capital was
understood narrowly, as the stock of durable products and equipment owned by mer-
chants or enterprises, which could yield future exchange value (Smith, 1993, p. 162).
In the late nineteenth century, however, capital theory developed in line with
subjective theories of value. As part of this, the concept of capital was generalized
to encompass all utility-yielding objects. The seminal neoclassical treatment of cap-
ital was developed by Irving Fisher. Indeed, Fisher’s work is still cited in contem-
porary governance literature on sustainable development and comprehensive
wealth accounting (UNECE & Eurostat & OECD, 2013, p. 64). Fisher critiqued the
classical definitions, since they attempted to draw a line neatly around business
stock, yielding market returns. But if ‘income’ was understood in subjective terms,
then wealth (or ‘capital’) should encompass any aspect of the physical world which
produced utility (Fisher, 1906, p. 58). Crucial to Fisher’s definition of capital was
not whether the object yielded a monetary return, but rather the temporal distinc-
tion between economic flows and stocks (Tobin, 2005). Fisher argued that ‘income’
should be understood not as monetary revenue but more broadly as the ongoing
flow of desirable experiences (‘psychic income’) consumed over an accounting
period, and ‘capital’ as any assets that yielded these flows of utility.
This led to a potentially radically expansive conception of capital, far broader
than the ‘business stock’ definitions found in classical political economy (see
Tobin, 2005). Fisher argued, for instance, that: ‘wealth is wealth only because of its
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services; and services are services only because of their desirability in the mind of
man [sic]’ (Fisher, 1906, p. 41). Thus, Fisher extended the notion of capital to all
physical things which yielded desirable events, or prevented undesirable events,
including where the benefit they produced was non-monetary (ibid, pp. 1043-4).
Even perishable objects used up immediately (like bread) were conceived of as
short-lived capital assets, as they yielded psychic income (the pleasure of eating it).
Capital had thus been conceptually expanded from durable stock yielding market
returns to refer to any parts of the material universe that yield utility to humans -
including, foreshadowing the human capital literature, human beings themselves.
However, Fisher’s definition also delimited capital in two significant ways.
Firstly, it made wealth dependent on ownership and property rights, even if not
necessarily the exchange of these rights. For instance, Fisher insisted that, while it
‘is not necessary that it should continually change hands… it is necessary that
wealth should be owned’, and moreover defined wealth formally as ‘all those parts
of the material universe which have been appropriated to the uses of mankind’
(ibid, p. 3). This move has had important contemporary repercussions for the
accounting treatment of knowledge (discussed below), leading to the focus on
measuring the returns on formal qualifications that can be understood as being
‘owned’ by the student that obtains them.
Secondly, Fisher linked the accounting value of capital back to market returns.
Fisher drew a crucial distinction between the physical objects which actually com-
posed wealth (‘capital instruments’), and the accounting value of capital stocks in
monetary units, or ‘capital value’ (ibid, pp. 66-67). He suggested that:
[E]ach individual kind of wealth may be measured in its own special unit – pounds,
gallons, yards; but for most purposes it is more important to measure the value of wealth,
and this may be done in dollars and cents, pounds and shillings… this is also a species of
physical measurement, but involves the principle of exchange… the concept of value
[depends] on that of price; that of price in turn on exchange (Fisher, 1906, pp. 9-10).
In this way, Fisher upheld the conflation of price, exchange and value character-
istic of neoclassical thought, reproducing the ‘economistic fallacy’ identified by
Polanyi. His justification for this move was to conform to ‘business usage’, arguing
that ‘the businessman [sic] ordinarily uses the term “capital” in the sense of cap-
ital-value’ (Fisher, 1906, p. 67).
Hence, while neoclassical capital theory broadened the definition of wealth, it
simultaneously circumscribed its meaning. Hypothetically, all utility-yielding objects
were now capital, but in practice it was restricted to those enclosed by property
rights, and their accounting value could only be established through an estimation
of future market returns. This ambiguity – the coexistence of a theoretically expan-
sive definition of capital with a narrow, market-based understanding of its eco-
nomic value – paved the way both to the proliferation of the concept of capital in
post-war economic thought and to contemporary problems encountered in
accounting for non-produced assets such as nature and knowledge.
3.2. Rise of the capital accounting approach to sustainable development
It was only with the development of national accounting that regular measurements
of national capital stock emerged. At this point, natural and human capital were
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explicitly excluded from the emerging system of global economic statistics (UN,
1953, p. 7). Hence at the founding of the national accounts the economic value of
knowledge and the natural environment was placed at zero.
Over the post-war decades, the limitations of the asset boundary established by
the original SNA became increasingly evident. In the 1970s, the Limits to Growth
report (Club of Rome, 1972) and environmental economists such as Georgescu-
Roegen (1971) placed economic growth within its ecological and thermodynamic
constraints. The metaphor of ‘natural capital’ was increasingly used to theorize
these shifts (Akerman, 2003), as a conceptual framework through which to under-
stand the services provided to the economy by the natural environment and bio-
sphere (Daly, 1987; Pearce & Atkinson, 1993). At the same time, there was a shift
in economic theory towards viewing knowledge and innovation as endogenous to
the growth process. Chicago School economists such as Gary Becker began to think
about education as a form of investment in future income and wage generation
(Becker, 1962; Schultz, 1960). Later, post-war neo-Keynesian growth models –
which had posited technological change as an external variable (Solow, 1957) –
were replaced by endogenous models which emphasized the institutional drivers of
innovation (Romer, 1994). This prompted a change to thinking about education
spending and skill development as an investment in the ‘human capital stock’ of
a society.
While economists, ecologists and sociologists began thinking of natural resour-
ces and human knowledge as components of national wealth over the post-war
years, the capital accounting approach has become the dominant framework for
measuring sustainability in global governance only in the late 2000s (Kulig et al.,
2010). The concept of ‘sustainable development’ was popularized by the report of
the UN’s World Commission on Environment and Development (1987). The
notion of natural capital was mentioned in the Brundtland report (ibid, p. 48), but
there were few concerted attempts at formally integrating the depletion of natural
resources into national accounting systems in the 1990s – largely because of the
complex valuation and methodological challenges involved.
Immediately after Brundtland, two main approaches were taken to the measure-
ment of sustainable development: sustainable development indicators (SDIs) and
adjusted GDP measures. Both approaches, however, encountered growing dissatis-
faction during the 2000s. SDIs were regarded as having no coherent theoretical
foundation, and reflecting the transient policy priorities of different administrations
(UNECE & Eurostat & OECD, 2008, pp. 3-4). Composite indicators and adjusted
GDP figures also faced criticism for being flawed or theoretically inconsistent, and
failing to distinguish clearly between the measurement of current welfare its future
sustainability.
Consequently, in the late 2000s the global approach to measuring sustainability
was increasingly re-oriented around a more formal wealth accounting framework,
rooted in the neoclassical capital theory first outlined by Fisher (Kulig et al., 2010).
Influential in this respect was a UN taskforce created in 2005 (UNECE, Eurostat
and OECD, 2013). This global taskforce was mandated with formalizing approaches
to the measurement of sustainable development, by reviewing the various measure-
ment approaches that had emerged since Brundtland. It strongly advocated a cap-
ital-based approach, which understands stocks of natural, human and social capital
as additional assets within an extended national balance sheet:
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If these stocks are calculated using a common measure and assumptions are made about
the substitutability of various capital stocks, changes in the total stock of wealth (per
capita) will provide information on the sustainability of the development path of each
country (UNECE, Eurostat and OECD, 2013, p. 63).
Work by the OECD (2001), WB, (2006) and UNEP, (2014) also influenced the
trend for treating sustainability through the perspective of capital accounting. The
recommendations of the Stiglitz Commission cemented this shift. Its final report
stated that: ‘sustainability requires the simultaneous preservation or increase in sev-
eral “stocks” … of natural resources but also of human, social and physical capital’
(Stiglitz et al., 2010, pp. 77-68).
Consequently, by the beginning of the 2010s the measurement of sustainable
development had been re-framed as a problem measuring the depletion or main-
tenance of comprehensive global ‘capital’, now extended beyond the manufactured
and financial stocks within the original SNA asset boundary to include natural
resources, ecosystems, human knowledge and social institutions. This has prompted
ongoing work by the global statistical and national accounting community to trans-
late this into a practical measurement framework.
4. The development of global human capital accounting
While the wealth accounting approach to measuring sustainability is theoretically ele-
gant, implementing it in practice has posed significant operational challenges.
Natural capital accounting has attracted much more attention than HCA: in 2014,
the UN System of Environmental-Economic Accounting (SEEA) standardised the
measurement of tradeable natural resources in ways consistent with the central SNA
framework. But even here, ecosystem resources such as biodiversity stubbornly resist
easy valuation or theoretical consensus.
4.1. The global governance of HCA
While it still lacks the international standardisation that the SEEA provides natural
capital measurement, in the last decade the human capital agenda has been devel-
oped by a variety of actors and initiatives, both at the international level and within
NSIs. The OECD played an important role in the early 2010s, through its Human
Capital Consortium. This forum brought together experts from 18 countries and
two IOs (Eurostat and the International Labour Organization). Building on earlier
experimental work (OECD, 2001), it demonstrated the viability of developing mon-
etary estimates of human capital using currently available datasets, to supplement
the growth accounting models that inform the OECD’s policy recommendations,
such as its annual Going for Growth reports.
At the UN Level, the UNECE has played a leading co-ordination role, specific-
ally through the Conference of European Statisticians (CES). CES brings together
international statistical and accounting experts from European NSIs to form work-
ing parties to develop experimental statistical concepts, with the view to agreeing
common methodological approaches to aid comparability and policy uptake.
Building on OECD and CES work, in 2016 the UNECE produced a Guide on
Measuring Human Capital. While lacking the status of a formal UN standard, such
as the SNA or SEEA, this is the first global standard for HCA and has formed a
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key reference point for its growing use by IOs and NSIs. The UNECE has subse-
quently created a task force which produces regularly updated monetary estimates
of human capital stock based on this Guide (UNECE, 2019).
The World Bank has been at the forefront of mainstreaming HCA in develop-
ment policy, drawing on these earlier initiatives to develop monetary ‘human cap-
ital wealth’ estimates for more than 100 countries (WB, 2018a). This reflects a
long-standing interest in wealth accounting as a means to assess the sustainability
implications of its development financing and policy work. However, it was given
additional impetus in 2018 with the launch of its Human Capital Project, a major
cross-Bank initiative to embed human capital into the design of its funding instru-
ments and policy advice (WB, 2018b). The embrace of monetary estimates of
human capital by the Bank represents a significant shift, supplementing its non-
monetary Human Capital Index.
Thus, international work on HCA has taken place in a variety of forums,
focussed on key expert networks and working groups within the OECD, World
Bank and UNECE/CES, that have brought together national expertise to catalyse
the uptake of HCA in global policy. Alongside this, certain NSIs have emerged as
epistemic entrepreneurs. The UK’s ONS stands out, having produced monetary
measures of the UK’s human capital stock as early as 2012. A major update to its
methodology commenced in 2018, with the eventual aim of ‘integrating human
capital into the national accounts’ (ONS, 2018, p. 9). Statistics Norway and
Statistics Canada have also been influential, reflected by leadership within inter-
national task forces.
Three main approaches have emerged to valuing human capital stock: 1) lifetime
income (or output) methods; 2) cost-based (or input) methods, and; 3) residual
methods. The lifetime income approach – first developed in academia by
Jorgenson and Fraumeni (1992) – is emerging as dominant, endorsed by OECD’s
Consortium, the UNECE Guidelines, the World Bank’s human capital wealth esti-
mates and national initiatives (ONS, 2012; UNECE, 2016; WB 2018; Statistics
Norway, 2018). However, in the process of operationalizing these methodologies,
statistical experts have encountered persistent problems in disentangling the
‘commodity-like’ aspects of education from its wider social, psychological and eco-
nomic functions. The way in which they handle these methodological dilemmas
has significant implications for global welfare and education policy. Two things of
global HCA methodologies stand out in this regard: firstly, the implications of
focusing on formal qualifications as the site of human capital ‘investment’; sec-
ondly, the narrow focus on labor market outcomes as the economic ‘return’ on
this investment.
4.2. Education spending as human capital ‘investment’
Somewhat ironically, given the Hayekian emphasis on the importance of tacit local
knowledge to the superiority of the market mechanism (Hayek, 1945), market-
based methods for valuing human capital currently focus entirely on the labor
market returns on formal qualifications. This can be related to the neoclassical
treatment of ‘capital’ and its emphasis on ownership and exchange.
However, while qualifications can be understood as the tangible outcome of
‘investment’ in the formation of skills that an individual then sells on the labor
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market, this is complicated by the fact that these skills become embodied in this
individual and cannot be extracted from them or transferred. Is this knowledge
therefore a separate asset the student ‘owns’, or simply an embodied property of
them as a person? This ambiguity is reflected in the description of the 2008 SNA
asset boundary, where human capital was excluded from official national accounts
on the grounds that it ‘become[s] embodied in the persons of the consumers’ (UN,
2008, p. 97) and ‘is acquired through learning, studying and practicing, activities
that cannot be undertaken by anybody else on behalf of the student’ (ibid, p. 8).
The subsequent development of international HCA methodologies has been
influenced by this exchange-based accounting definition of an asset, premised on
knowledge as a transferable, commodity-like good. Discussing the matter, the
UNECE guidance critiques the exclusion of knowledge from the SNA, but only on
the grounds that:
[I]f one looks upon human capital as a separate, although embodied in a person, entity, it
does not seem problematic to view the relevant person owning human capital which
clearly brings future economic benefits (UNECE, 2016, p. 20).
Thus, while the definition of capital is extended to skills and knowledge, the
guide firmly re-inscribes the neoclassical notion that their economic component is
somehow separate from the individual who ‘owns’ them. Consequently, all the local
know-how of a population that cannot be traced to qualifications built up through
formal educational investment are excluded from HCA valuations (ONS, 2012b, p.
29; UNECE, 2016).
Narrowing the scope of human capital to formal education in this way allows
workers’ embodied talent and skills to be separated conceptually from formal edu-
cational investment and its market returns. It thus allows human capital formation
to enter the neoclassical realm of choice and scarcity (students’ choices to delay
entry into the workforce to raise future earnings potential, and over which qualifi-
cations to acquire). However, this approach has encountered persistent technical
and conceptual problems.
Firstly, distinguishing the asset being invested in from the embodied person it is
acquired by (and embodied in) is far from straightforward. The same unit of
‘education’ spending can produce different results in brighter or less able students
(referred to in HCA literature as the ‘heterogeneity of human capital’). The main
way of approaching this problem is to distinguish an underlying genetic compo-
nent of human capital (outside the scope of accounting valuation) from the eco-
nomic ‘capital’ built up by educational investment. The ONS states that:
Some of an individual’s capital is innate to them and is in some sense, a non-produced
asset. Thus, the asset created by education could be regarded as the improvement in
human capital by education and training (ONS, 2012b, p. 9).
Indeed, this heterogeneity was used by the UNECE as a justification for rejecting
the cost-based approach to valuing human capital (which focuses on summing
depreciated past education spending) and favouring the discounted lifetime income
method as better reflecting the ‘true’ economic benefits of this spending.
A wider problem is the clearly vast significance of informal training, knowledge
and ‘know-how’ to market activity, and the impossibility of individualising the
common pool of knowledge and skills that underpin productive innovation. The
UNECE guidance acknowledges, for instance, that: ‘human capital results not only
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from schooling and training, but also from general experience both at work and
in leisure-time activities’ (UNECE, 2016, p. 35); while OECD work previously
noted that continued acquisition of skills by adults is ‘informal, experiential and
interwoven with daily living and working’ (OECD, 2001, p. 24). Another problem
often discussed in human capital literature is ‘spill-over effects’, a technical term
for the intrinsically social nature of knowledge. The UNECE Guide accepts, for
example, the limitations of valuation methods focused on the individual returns
on educational spending because they ‘focus on individual’s human capital and
aggregate them to arrive at the population measure. This ignores spill-overs
between workers, so that the whole may be more than the sum of the parts’
(UNECE, 2016, p. 52).
The scale of the contribution of this informal, collective knowledge, even if
considering only the market economy, is huge. An OECD study, for instance,
attempted to capture the full contribution of human capital by measuring it
using the ‘residual’ method. Assuming GDP to be a 5% income return on the
complete wealth of a society, the study reasoned that the value of overall wealth
must amount to 20 times GDP (OECD, 2013). But the wealth observed in SNA
balance sheets only amounts to 2.6-6.6 times GDP, even when including natural
resources. Even adding an estimate of human capital stock based on the lifetime
income of formal education left 25% of this ‘total’ national wealth unaccounted
for. This was attributed to an ‘intangible capital residue’, reflecting social know-
ledge and institutions that could not be captured in the private returns to for-
mal education.
Another problem in this regard is the non-transferrable nature of much of the
skills and experience that support the market economy. Many of the skills gained
in employment relate to a particular institution or process. This is even more the
case regarding soft skills such as the inter-personal relationships built up while
working with others. It is hard to distinguish these context-specific skills from
generic transferrable skills such as ‘team-work’ – but these are lost as soon as a
person moves company or sector. As an OECD report observes: ‘individuals are
unlikely to be able to extract a full rental value from their organisation-specific skills,
since their employer is their sole potential purchaser’ (OECD, 2001). Therefore, the
status of these skills as ‘human capital’ is precarious, in neoclassical terms, since they
are non-transferrable: their value cannot be established through exchange on the
market. Nevertheless, such skills are crucial to supporting market activity
and innovation.
Finally, accountants devising human capital methodologies encounter problems
disentangling the ‘consumption-like’ component of education from its productive
or ‘investment-like’ component. This stems fundamentally from the same problem:
that education is embedded in non-economic functions and entangled with the
embodied life of the person. Isolating its commodity-relevant aspects is almost
impossible in practice. A quote from the UNECE guidance on human capital valu-
ation illustrates this point:
To the extent that individuals enjoy their courses or have their range of interests, tastes
and activities extended, educational expenditures also provide some consumption benefits.
Thus, the difficulty lies in determining which part of educational expenditure is investment
spending and which part is consumption (UNECE, 2016, p. 36).
REVIEW OF INTERNATIONAL POLITICAL ECONOMY 13
As this shows, part of the problem lies in the neoclassical assumption that pro-
ductive work must be a disutility (Jevons, 1965 [1871]; Marshall, 2009 [1890]), and
therefore the time spent by students acquiring knowledge must be conceptualized
as something endured merely for the future consumption possibilities it grants
access to. Unfortunately, for this theory, education seems to provide intrinsic pleas-
ure and meaning to many.
Furthermore, formal education generates benefits to the individual that are
not directly related to improving their immediate job prospects, but are never-
theless associated with positive labor market outcomes. This is recognized in
the human capital literature, but generally these benefits are hived off as ‘social’
or ‘non-economic’ returns on education. The UNECE task force states that
‘many see the personal and social well-being effects of learning as being as
important as the economic ones’ (UNECE & Eurostat & OECD, 2008, p. 51).
However, this very distinction is hard to sustain. It has been shown, for
instance, that higher educational attainment is associated with better health
(ONS, 2012b), and improved social networks and connections (OECD, 2001).
These, in turn, are correlated with better labor market prospects. This raises
the problem of where to stop valuing these less direct market returns on educa-
tion, and also how far (in increasingly nepotistic neoliberal labor markets)
qualifications represent a genuine form of productive ‘investment’ rather than
serving as gate-keeping devices that mediate access to networks of power
and privilege.
Consequently, even narrowing the measurement of human capital down to for-
mal education, which provides it with a semblance of the neoclassical features of
capital reviewed in section 3 (such as fungibility, transferability and choice), it has
not been possible to disentangle the ‘economic’ value of these – relevant to the
generation of market income – from its other functions. Fundamentally, this relates
to the fact that knowledge is a ‘fictitious capital’: it’s economic function is
embedded in and inseparable from its broader social and psychological functions,
for both individuals and societies.
4.3. Wages as the ‘return’ on human capital
A second feature of the development of international HCA methodologies has been
the difficulty of conceptualising the ‘return’ on educational investment. Cost-based
approaches attempt to side-step this problem, by simply measuring the current
value of past investment in education, regardless of the outcome. However, there
are problems with adapting cost-based accounting tools – designed to measure a
stock of physical machinery and equipment – to knowledge embodied in human
beings. They require that a measure of depreciation be applied to the outlays on
formal education, over a student’s lifetime. This method was developed to value of
machinery or plant, that possesses a second-hand re-sale market, a linear aging
profile and predictable deterioration through greater use. One can detect an evident
desire within HCA literature to think of knowledge in these terms, often using dir-
ect similes. The UNECE guide states that: ‘Like physical capital, human capital
depreciates over time’, due to ‘the wear and tear of skills due to aging’ (UNECE,
2016, p. 37).
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However, there are obvious problems with applying the metaphor of depreci-
ation over a lifespan to the knowledge embodied in human beings. Knowledge and
skills often increase with experience, and they are bound up with the wider devel-
opment and life trajectory of the individual. The UNECE guide notes, with appar-
ent surprise, that:
The value of human capital will decrease by aging, and the consequent shortening of the
period to retirement or death. This has clear similarities with the shortening of the
remaining service life of more traditional assets. On the other hand, human capital is
different… embodied knowledge may actually increase as a result of using it in practice, as
a result of gaining more experience, etc. Or vice versa, the stock of human capital may
depreciate quicker because of non-use, for example as a result of long-term unemployment
(ibid, p. 28).
Elsewhere the ONS acknowledges that ‘the appreciation of human capital is often
ignored in the literature, despite some empirical evidence that showed that human cap-
ital can appreciate at younger ages’ (ONS, 2012b, p. 8). The UNECE guidance ultim-
ately accepts, based on this, that for cost-based HCA measures: ‘The choice of
depreciation for measuring human capital is essentially arbitrary because of a lack of
empirical evidence’ (UNECE, 2016, p. 37). In other words, because the idea of an asset
as something that is steadily worn down through use is ingrained in the accounting
treatment of manufactured capital, depreciation rates developed for machines are
applied to the knowledge and skills embodied in humans, even though this bears little
resemblance to the empirical reality of how people actually acquire or lose skills.
Consequently, the output-based ‘lifetime income’ approach is generally favoured.
This links the present value of human capital to the future labor market earnings
of an individual. As one ONS paper strikingly argues:
[I]t is difficult to quantify elements of the education process that produce higher output,
accordingly it makes sense to use labor market evaluations as representing the worth of an
educated individual (ONS, 2012a, p. 9).
Since the value of human capital is coupled to the generation of market wages,
if a person becomes unemployed or retires their contribution to the ‘human capital’
of a nation immediately falls to zero.
This approach produces some counter-intuitive valuation results. It means that
the appreciation and depreciation in human capital values relates more to tempor-
ary prevailing employment and wage conditions in a country than the substantive
content of the skills or knowledge its population possesses. For example, according
to ONS estimates, the UK’s human capital base fell from £19 trillion to £18 trillion
in the aftermath of the financial crisis, almost entirely due to a short-term rise in
unemployment (ONS, 2015). In other words, £1 trillion had been wiped from the
extended national balance sheet, not through any deterioration in the skill base of
the population or long term demographic trends such as the aging population, but
because of cyclical fluctuations in the labor market.
Emerging global HCA methods render the economic value of knowledge
dependent on discounted future labor market returns on formal qualifications.
However, this has been conceptually and practically problematic to operationalise.
Reflecting the ‘economistic fallacy’ of reducing the economic value of knowledge to
its market returns, it has proved difficult to disentangle the income-generating
aspects of education from its broader value to individuals and society.
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5. Human capital accounting and the commodification of global
welfare policy
Emerging global HCA methodologies have significant implications for framing
national economic policy space. By tying the value of human capital wealth to
labor market outcomes, lifetime income approaches naturalize the idea that sustain-
able welfare systems must be grounded in the expansion of formal wage labor and
employment. They therefore measure not the contribution of education systems to
the generation of economic welfare per se, but rather the comparative degree of
commodification in different societies, equating this with the size of the human
capital stock and therefore to the ‘sustainability’ of different political economies.
This section first discusses some general policy implications of this methodological
approach, before analysing how these have manifested themselves in development
policy through the case of the World Bank’s Human Capital Project.
5.1. HCA and the future of welfare
The policy rationale for HCA is often framed in terms of assessing the long-term
‘sustainability’ of welfare systems (Statistics Canada, 2010). Potential impacts of the
adoption of global HCA methodologies on the framing of national education and
welfare policy include: 1) they incentivize states to pursue welfare regimes based on
labour market activation, as opposed to de-commodified solutions to welfare chal-
lenges; 2) they discourage investment in lifetime learning systems, and encourage
activation policies that generate immediate employment rather than re-skilling poli-
cies that produce longer term productivity gains; 3) they may incentivise certain
forms of education provision over others.
Turning to the first, using lifetime income estimates, policies aimed at redistrib-
uting paid employment more evenly across the population to make space for
unpaid economic activity necessarily serve to massively depreciate the value of a
nation’s human capital stock. This has important consequences for recent debates
over the possibility of de-commodified systems of care provision (Fraser, 2014;
Gorz, 1999; Tronto, 2017). For instance, the literature on Universal Basic Income
takes as a central premise that the sphere of wage work would shrink, and that this
would create space for unpaid forms of caring activity and volunteer work, either
in the family or the community (Standing, 2017).
Similarly, a substantial feminist literature has argued for the need to reduce
working hours and re-distribute work more evenly through job-sharing and part-
time working, to increase gender-symmetry in unpaid childcare duties, rather than
push for a model based on universal full-time employment and commodified child-
care provision (LeBaron, 2010; Lutz, 2017; V. Schultz, 2010). Other potential ways
of organising economic activity opened up by technological change, such as the
rise of P2P production and the sharing economy (Frenken & Schor, 2017) would
also erode human capital, as they would shrink the market ‘returns’ delivered on
education, even while they may enhance substantive economic welfare. HCA meth-
odologies re-create a binary distinction between work and leisure that renders
them unable to conceptualise these sorts of emergent economic relationships, or
complex interactions between the market and non-market spheres.
16 D. YARROW
Secondly, there has been much debate in recent years over the aging population
of Western societies and the implications for the sustainability of retirement
expectations, pensions and care provision (Hedge & Borman, 2012). The main-
stream response to these challenges has been framed around the need to increase
the retirement age and extend the formal employment age (Eurofound, 2014).
These sorts of policies would indeed appreciate human capital as currently meas-
ured, as they would extend the discounted lifetime income used to calculate its
value. An alternative perspective has, however, emphasised a more holistic notion
of ‘active aging’, stressing the need to facilitate the elderly in engaging with diverse
forms of productive activity, including volunteering or mutual support networks
(Phillipson, 1998; Walker & Maltby, 2012). This is especially relevant in the context
of utilising the skills of those made unemployed towards the end of their working
life due to sectoral shifts, automation and de-industrialization.
However, based on the lifetime income method of discounting future wages, the
human capital of the elderly is valued at close to zero. This has obvious implications
when assessing policies aimed at employing the accumulated knowledge and experience
of older people in volunteering, childcare or community contexts. These would not be
able to arrest or offset a decline in human capital that resulted from forced early retire-
ment. This also interacts with debates over the design of lifelong education systems, as
the value of investing in adult education and re-skilling programmes (Livingstone &
Guile, 2012) would be less than educational investment in the school-age population.
Finally, methodologies for valuing human capital may influence the sorts of edu-
cation that will be prioritized. At the most immediate level, they are likely to pri-
oritize applied vocational skills over general intelligence and creativity. Since these
skills are what labor markets values right now, they will enhance immediate labour
market prospects and increase the value of human capital. However, this may be at
the cost of longer-term welfare gains produced by more generalised forms of intel-
ligence (Means, 2017). The application of uniform discount rates also takes little
heed of future shifts in the demand for skills. For instance, some research suggests
that soft skill will be increasingly valued as automation leads to a secular shift
towards affect-based caring work (Nokelainen et al., 2018). Finally, the sole focus
on formal paid education ignores welfare gains that could be produced by the col-
lective or informal provision of education itself (Illich, 1971) – for instance, new
forms of mutual learning (based on time-banking and other forms of reciprocity)
that digital communication has opened up (Hart, 2001). Because there is no mon-
etary investment involved, policies aimed at institutionalising these social forms
appear to erode a nation’s asset base.
5.2. The influence of HCA on development policy: The case of the world bank
To understand how these general features of the political economy of HCA bear
upon concrete policy processes, it is instructive to examine the case of the World
Bank’s Human Capital Project (HCP), launched in 2018 (WB, 2018b). Based
around ‘using policy and results-based lending to support critical human capital
reforms’ (WB, 2019c, p. 30), this agenda plays a central role in the Bank’s wider
development strategy for poverty eradication by 2030. Through it, the Bank has
gone furthest of the major economic governance IOs in embedding human capital
accounts into the design and evaluation of its financing practices and policy advice.
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In 2018, the World Bank for the first time calculated monetary estimates of the
stock of human capital using the lifetime income approach (WB 2018a, p. 116). This
was a major change of approach, as previously the Bank has relied solely on an indi-
cators-based approach to human capital measurement. These measures of human
capital wealth were developed to support the HCP, and play an increasing role in
the Bank’s policy advice, country reviews and strategic priorities. As it argued:
‘providing an explicit measure of human capital contributes greatly to making wealth
accounts more useful for monitoring progress and for policy analysis’ (ibid, p. 34).
Significantly, these estimates now shape and justify the Bank’s policy advice and
funding priorities, especially in the field of care, welfare and the labor market.
This can be seen both in regional human capital strategies, and in specific coun-
try reviews and surveillance. Turning to the first, in 2019 the Bank launched
a human capital plan for the Middle East and North Africa (MENA) region and
for Africa, to support the HCP (WB, 2019b; 2019c). These set priorities for the
expansion of Bank human capital financing, distributed as ‘program-for-results’
(P4R) and Development Policy Financing (DPF) grants. In MENA, human capital
targeted financing is set to increase from $1.119bn in 2019 to $2.5bn by 2024,
while in Africa it is set to reach $15bn by 2021-23 (ibid). They also guide the
Bank’s policy consultancy and capacity-building work.
In both policy documents, the regions are pathologized on the basis of compara-
tive analysis of their human capital growth rates. For instance, the MENA human
capital plan laments how ‘with the lowest percentage of human capital as a share
of total wealth per capita of any region in the world (35%), MENA faces a severe
human capital gap’ (WB 2019b, p. 3). This is, moreover, linked explicitly to their
relative lack of labour commodification and an insufficiently developed free market
economy, or ‘informality’ in the Bank’s terminology. Accordingly, The MENA
human capital plan outlines a number of ‘priority interventions that can help build,
protect, and utilize human capital’ (ibid). These involve using targeted funding and
policy consultancy to ensure ‘young people have access to strong world-class edu-
cation that equips them with the skills desired by the global job market and/or to
start their own innovative businesses in open and competitive markets’ (ibid, p. 6)
and to reform education systems ‘with a focus on employability in the private sec-
tor’ (ibid, p. 19) In Africa, the Bank likewise seeks to ‘reshape its portfolio to
encourage impactful human capital projects’(WB, 2019c, p. 24). This means, in
practice, encouraging ‘workplace learning for better market fit and employability
skills’ and seeking to ‘foster an enabling business environment for wage jobs in
firms of all sizes as well as productive, remunerative entrepreneurship activities’
(ibid, p. 21).
One interesting feature of this agenda is the way in which it interacts with the
Bank’s discourse on gender equality and female empowerment. The Bank readily
acknowledges in the report outlining its HCA methodology, that:
Although the SNA includes unpaid household production of some goods, it excludes the
production by households of services for final consumption within the household, such as
family care… Because these services are excluded from the SNA, they are also excluded
from the human capital estimates reported here (WB 2018a, p. 29).
Nevertheless, by the time these measures appear in the regional strategies and
country-level analysis, the implications of this important qualification are rarely
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unpacked. The measures are used to justify the commodification of care work as
the only path to enhancing human capital wealth, by bringing female labor market
participation up to parity with male workers. The MENA strategy prioritises
‘creat[ing] formal jobs in the care economy’ and ‘closing the gap in female employ-
ment by improving conditions that facilitate women’s insertion into the labor mar-
ket to realize their potential as productive workers’ (WB, 2019b, p. 19), while the
Africa plan likewise emphasises ‘boosting labor market participation, especially for
women’ (WB, 2019c, p. 21). The Bank’s MENA Gender Innovation Lab was
launched specifically ‘to address the low participation rate of women in the region’s
labor markets… to achieve higher, more sustainable growth’ (WB, 2019e).
This is not to suggest that moves towards gender parity in labour markets are
unwelcome. However, the way in which human capital estimates work is to render
one particular means of achieving this (full-time employment for both genders in
the context of the commodification of care provision) contribute to the national
balance sheet and therefore sustainability, while other routes (for instance, job shar-
ing and work redistribution for both genders, or commons-based care networks)
cannot (LeBaron, 2010). Drawing on the analysis in previous sections, we can
understand these policy recommendations as tautological. Because the value of
human capital has been made, by methodological design, to depend upon its pro-
jected contribution to labour market income, by definition countries with higher
levels of de-commodified care provision will have lower human capital wealth.
These dynamics are further highlighted by the way HCA is now influencing
country-level Bank’s outputs such as their economic updates. For instance, the
Bank used HCA estimates prominently in its Tanzania Economic Update in 2019
(WB, 2019d). Again, these valuations led to the conclusion that ‘human capital as a
share of total wealth is lower in Tanzania than in comparison to most other coun-
tries’, and consequently ‘Tanzania’s progress toward sustainable development was
minimal’ (ibid, p. 4; 37). The policy recommendations on gender equality and
empowerment therefore again reflect a focus on commodification to build human
capital and address this deficiency. The Bank argued that:
Losses in human capital wealth due to gender inequality in Tanzania are estimated at up to
$111 billion. Interventions in three main areas could narrow the gender earnings gap: (1)
reduce the time women spend in unpaid work and redistribute care responsibilities so that
they can spend more time in the labor market; (2) give women more access to and control
of productive assets; and (3) address market and institutional failures (ibid, p. 6).
By comparison, earlier Bank analysis of human capital in China applauded the
‘very rapid increase in urban human capital from the mid-1990s, in part because of
the transition to a market-oriented economy… showing that sustainable develop-
ment depends on a combination of capital accumulation and sound political econ-
omy’ (WB 2018a, p. 33). Again, this shows the circular way in which HCA
methods result in commodification boosting national wealth through its impact on
human capital stock, thus making ‘sustainability’ depend on a certain market-ori-
ented development trajectory.
As this case highlights, HCA exerts an increasing influence on the policy advice
and financing practices of major IOs. HCA standards play a role in determining
the conditions attached to the Bank’s various development funding facilities, and
how these interventions will be evaluated. Consolidating longer-term trends in the
Bank’s approach to poverty and social reproduction (Ruckert, 2010), HCA now
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plays an important role in pathologizing certain institutional regimes, notably those
premised on de-commodified systems of care. Bank discourse tends to frame these
recommendations as neutral, technical assessments of how to build and utilise
human capital – a dynamic which has been significantly strengthened by monetary
measures of human capital stock.
5.3. Reforming human capital accounting: Beyond the economistic fallacy?
Statistical agencies are increasingly reflexive about the limitations of current HCA
methods. This has partly come in response to criticism from civil society. The
ONS, for instance, publicly consulted on its HCA methodology, encountering
opposition to the exclusion of the unemployed from its human capital estimates
(ONS, 2012b p. 10). Consequently, two sets of human capital values for the UK are
now produced, one of which includes the unemployed. This allows a decompos-
ition of the extent to which depreciation of human capital wealth represents cyc-
lical unemployment or substantive demographic and educational shifts. In these
measures, however, the value of knowledge remains tied narrowly to labor market
participation. Nevertheless, some more fundamental reforms are being explored,
both nationally and by international working groups. There is a willingness to
include on-the-job training as well as formal qualifications in the future (ibid,
p. 14). More radically, the ONS has suggested the development of methodologies
which include the non-market sphere when valuing human capital stock, suggesting
‘future work could incorporate imputations of the value of non-market labor activ-
ity, including household production and leisure into the measures of human cap-
ital’ (ibid). The agenda on human capital measurement therefore interacts in
important ways with the development of accounting tools to estimate non-market
activity (Beneria, 1999; DeRock, 2019). If non-market production is included in
national income measures, then logically the valuation of human capital must also
be extended to include the skills that help people perform these non-mar-
ket activities.
The political implications for how knowledge is valued are potentially radical:
forms of learning that help citizens flourish in their various non-market roles and
responsibilities would enter economic statistical systems as a valuable ‘return’ on
knowledge. This may have dramatic effects on political assessments of the ‘value
for money’ education delivers to society. None of these changes have yet material-
ized. However, they do raise an important question for a Polanyian analysis of
HCA, and post-growth accounting reforms more generally. Would such moves be
sufficient to address the economistic fallacy reproduced by national accounting
frameworks and promote a ‘substantive’ representation of the human economy,
and the place of learning and knowledge within it? Indeed, is a Polanyian perspec-
tive compatible with such monetary accounting valuation at all?
Some 90 years before contemporary ‘beyond GDP’ statistical reforms, Polanyi’s
article on ‘socialist accounting’ explicitly addressed the role accounting systems
could play in the overcoming of market-centric economic reasoning (Polanyi 2016
[1922]). In this, he related the interwar socialist calculation debate to his political
philosophy, which centred around the possibility of freedom in modern industrial
societies with a complex division of labour (Cangiani, 2012). According to this
viewpoint, in natura calculation by the state (Neurath 2004 [1919]) and prices
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resulting from atomised market exchanges (Mises 1935 [1920]) offer an equally
flawed basis for responsible ethical action by people in their various diverse eco-
nomic roles: as workers, consumers, citizens etc. Price formation under global cor-
porate capitalism happened just as much ‘behind the backs’ of citizens as the
machinations of remote state bureaucracies. Rather than objective values, market
prices reflect the contingent imperatives of a society based around private property;
they exclude the social, ethical and environmental externalities that market interac-
tions produce (Polanyi 2016 [1920]). Hence, market price signals cannot give indi-
viduals an ‘overview’ of the effects and consequences of the complex economic,
social and ecological relationships they are part of, which might form the basis for
clear-sighted and responsible ethical action. Neither can delegation of such deci-
sion-making to centralised, technocratic planning bodies.
Polanyi suggested a way out of this dilemma, grounded in a radically different
approach to accounting. It imagined accounting values as the outcome of an expli-
citly political process of collective deliberation (Rosner, 1990). This would mean
that values for key commodities and resources would reflect social preferences
worked out in conscious democratic processes, which could only happen by
embedding these valuation practices in participatory institutions within the eco-
nomic process itself. Therefore, it would be naïve to assume that making technical
tweaks alone can address the economistic fallacies identified with the current meth-
ods for valuing knowledge.
The question remains, then, how should researchers and movements keen to
escape the ‘market mentality’ engage with global statistical methodologies that often
reproduces key features of this mode of reasoning? After all, is it not better to have
flawed statistics on the value of knowledge to the global political economy than
none? In this context it is instructive to recall Herman Daly’s remark, in response
to defences of the continued prominence of GDP due to a supposed lack of better
alternatives, that ‘no beer is better than poisoned beer’ (in Fioramonti, 2013, p. 82).
This could well apply to HCA measures, given the active distortions they introduce
into the measurement of ‘sustainability’ and national wealth.
More productively, three implications of this analysis seem clear. Firstly, caution
and reflexivity must be applied when using HCA measures developed by NSIs and
IOs in policy analysis and academic research. This should involve greater awareness
of the political assumptions and choices that are embedded in current methodolo-
gies, and qualification of any policy recommendations developed based on such
measures. Secondly, national-level democratic conversations about how knowledge
is valued within national accounting systems seem long overdue. Citizens assem-
blies and other innovative democratic mechanisms seem an ideal forum to discuss
methodological choices around HCA and their political consequences. This could
yield democratically legitimated recommendations to the international statistical
community, reflecting the outcome of these deliberations. Thirdly, more national
flexibility could be built into global HCA standards so that they could be better
tailored to national political economies, without the presumption of full-time uni-
versal wage labor as the ideal type of economic relationship.
These moves would, however, conflict with prevailing international statistical
norms that prize comparability, harmonisation and ‘objectivity’. They require a
broader re-imaging of the traditional relationship between statistical agencies and
democratic politics. Confronting the challenges of measuring post-industrial
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economies requires that international accounting experts are no longer be viewed
as technocrats that hand down authoritative metrics to referee national political
debates, but rather as co-creators that work with societies to ‘upload’ democratic
choices about how to represent complex and incommensurable economic values
into global statistical practice.
6. Conclusion
This paper has argued for the need for IPE literature to take the political economy
of human capital valuation seriously. Through a historical genealogy of human cap-
ital theory, and analysis of contemporary policy documents and expert interviews,
it has demonstrated how emerging international HCA practices have important
implications for framing national economic policy space. In contrast to the depo-
liticised discussion encountered in accounting literature, it has argued for under-
standing these as contingent political constructions that naturalize contestable
market-centric ideas about the value of knowledge, rooted in Karl Polanyi’s critique
of the ‘economistic fallacy’. Since these emergent accounting practices establish a
connection between the value of human capital stock (and thus national wealth)
and market income, the ‘sustainability’ of national development trajectories is made
to depend upon expanding participation in commodified relationships. Used as an
input into political assessments of ‘sustainable development’, and to formulate
development policy within IOs such as the World Bank, these methods represent
development trajectories predicated on various forms of non-market institutions as
unsustainable, as they would necessarily erode a country’s human capital stock
(even if they delivered substantive welfare gains). This finding is especially note-
worthy given that HCA forms a key part of the ‘beyond growth’ agenda in global
governance. Yet, as the case of the World Bank’s Human Capital Plan illustrates,
dominant international HCA standards in fact serve to promote market-driven
growth through their methodological design. This highlights how, to understand
the politics of economic governance agendas, it is crucial for constructivist scholar-
ship to look beyond institutional discourse to study the way in which ideational
shifts are operationalised through various technical and material practices.
The analysis has several implications. The first concerns the effect of inter-
national measurement practices on national democracy and economic policy space.
If a general criterion for policy indicators is that different available means for
attaining a desired outcome should not be built into the way in which that out-
come is measured (i.e., that they should measure outcomes independently of policy
inputs), currently dominant international methodologies fall short of this criterion.
The methods for measuring sustainable development pre-suppose the institutional
regimes and policy priorities through which it is to be achieved: commodified solu-
tions are, by methodological design, the only way to increase the human capital
base of a nation and place societies on a ‘sustainable’ footing. This shows the
importance of careful analysis of the assumptions which underpin accounting and
valuation practices disseminated by global governance, and their role in political
discourse. More specifically, it illustrates the need to critically analyze political dis-
courses that draw upon these valuations in support of claims about the economic
necessity of the expansion of wage labour, at the expense of alternative means of
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institutionalising welfare provision in response to the challenges of demographic
change and automation.
HCA remains an emerging field of international statistical practice. While its use
within IOs and states is expanding, the article has also highlighted the contested and
contestable nature of human capital measurement. It locates the source of this in the
essential embeddedness of knowledge and education in non-market processes, plac-
ing it in inherent tension with dominant neoclassical wealth accounting frameworks
based on the discounted future market returns on an asset. It has shown how this
tension has manifested itself in a number of paradoxes and tensions in HCA frame-
works, which statistical practitioners themselves are acutely aware of. This highlights
the value of further research as these measures diffuse more widely in national and
international policymaking. In particular, this research should prioritise understand-
ing changes in the dominant accounting methodologies, their ongoing diffusion into
the economic policy discourses of IOs and states, and how they are mobilized by dif-
ferent political actors within debates on the future of welfare policy.
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